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Signiﬁcant progress has been made in the past few decades towards liberalizing trade,
and nations now have been integrating more with each other than ever before. One
important implication of this trend of liberalization and integration is that many coun-
tries, in particular those small open economies, are now subject to more frequent shocks
from international market, with terms of trade shocks being the most prominent. There
is increasing public concern on how the variations in terms of trade may aﬀect unem-
ployment (Edwards 1986, Fernandez 1992, Matusz 1994, and Mendoza 1997). Do
short-term ﬂuctuations of terms of trade for manufactured goods (Backus and Crucini
2000) and the long-term declining terms of trade of primary goods (Zanias 2005) lead
to higher unemployment? If yes, would trade protection be an eﬀective tool to deal
with the unemployment problem? The key to answering these questions lies in a better
understanding of the mechanism through which terms of trade shocks aﬀect unemploy-
ment.
There have been numerous studies on the economic impact of terms of trade shocks,
yet little is known about how changes in terms of trade aﬀect domestic unemployment.
Traditional trade models assuming full employment and perfectly competitive labor
markets are simply not well equipped to answer questions about unemployment. Al-
though there are some early attempts to model the impact of terms of trade shocks on
unemployment (Brecher 1974, 1992), the typical assumption is a labor market featuring
higher than equilibrium wages that leads to unemployment.
The recent development of micro-based models of unemployment has emphasized
that unemployment may arise endogenously as a result of labor market frictions as it
1takes time and other resources for the unemployed to ﬁnd jobs and for ﬁrms to ﬁll vacan-
cies (McCall 1970, Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982 and Pissarides 1985). This contrasts
with the assumption in classical equilibrium theory where a smooth and instantaneous
adjustment in, for example the wage, a centralized labor market will always lead to
full employment. Emphasis on labor market frictions and the development of search
theory (Pissarides 2000), along with other micro-based models of unemployment, make
it possible to study the problem of unemployment in a general equilibrium framework.
In a pioneering work that integrates search theory into a traditional general equi-
librium model, Davidson, et al (1988) developed a two-sector model with search unem-
ployment in one sector. The introduction of search unemployment into the two-sector
model leads to ineﬃcient equilibria and changes the basic relationship between factor
rewards and commodity prices compared with that in a frictionless economy. This, for
the ﬁrst time, provides a framework that is very much in the spirit of the neoclassical
two-sector model, yet allows for frictional unemployment, to examine some employ-
ment related economic issues, such as the incidence of income taxation, the eﬀects of
employment protection, and the impact of minimum wage laws.
Davidson et al (1999) took up the issue — the impact of trade on unemployment —
by developing a two-good and two-factor (2 × 2) model with search unemployment in
a special two country setting where a relatively capital-abundant large country trades
with a small, relatively labor-abundant country and trade liberalization leads to spe-
cialization for the small country while the large country remains diversiﬁed. As it takes
time for unemployed factors (capital and labor) to ﬁnd each other and start a produc-
tive partnership, the characteristics of labor market institutions such as the degree of
eﬃciency of job search and job dissolution (search technology) matter for unemploy-
2ment. In this special setting, Davidson et al (1999), followed by Davidson and Matusz
(2004), were able to derive a result that explicitly links trade to unemployment, whereby
trade between a small country and a capital-abundant large country with a relatively
more eﬃcient search technology increases the aggregate unemployment rate in the large
country. Nevertheless, the impact of terms of trade shocks on unemployment was not
modeled explicitly.
In a similar vein, Hosios (1990) also develops a two-sector, two-factor general equi-
librium model with labor market search frictions featuring the Nash Non-Cooperative
Bargaining surplus sharing rule that is constrained Pareto eﬃcient. However, Hosios’
(1990) focuses are mainly on the impact of changes in terms of trade on income distri-
bution, as well as changes in factor endowment on sectoral output. A recent attempt
made by Walde and Weiss (2006) extends Pissarides (2000) model to a two-sector case,
which explicitly accounts for the eﬀects of changes in the relative product price on
wages and unemployment of a small open economy. They show that a decrease in the
world relative price leads to an increase in the unemployment, while the employment
eﬀect of relative price changes disappears if workers hold all of the bargaining power in
as p e c i ﬁc factor model.
The objective of our paper is to investigate the mechanism through which the
variations of terms of trade impact on unemployment in a small open economy with non-
traded goods. Diﬀering from previous studies, our two-sector search model distinguishes
between the traded and non-traded sectors. To keep the model tractable, we endogenize
search unemployment using the theory of optimal stopping rules (McCall 1970), which
links unemployment with workers’ expected lifetime income through their reservation
productivity (Pissarides 2000, p. 37). This simple model allows us to show analytically
3how an improvement in the terms of trade leads to a reduction in the unemployment
rates in both the traded and non-traded sectors, while deterioration in terms of trade
increases the unemployment rates in both sectors.
The structure of the paper is as follows - in the next section we develop a two-sector
model that distinguishes between the traded and non-traded sectors and endogenizes
sectoral search unemployment. The third section applies the two-sector search model
with non-traded goods to examine how changes in the terms of trade aﬀect search
unemployment. The ﬁnal section concludes.
II. A Two-sector Search Model with Non-traded Goods
Consider an economy that produces three goods: two intermediate goods and one ﬁnal
consumption good. Intermediate goods are produced by using workers when they are
m a t c h e dw i t hj o bv a c a n c i e s . 1and the ﬁnal consumption good is produced by using
the two intermediate goods; that is, the traded and non-traded intermediate goods
denoted by subscripts T and N, respectively. Both the traded intermediate goods and
ﬁnal consumption goods can be traded internationally. The production technology for
the ﬁnal consumption good takes a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form:
q =[ τ(qD
T )ρ +( 1− τ)(qD
N)ρ]1−ρ, (ρ Â 0) (1)
where q is the output of the ﬁnal consumption good, and is the demand for intermediate
1Although we exclude capital in our discussion, we do have two factors to search: vacancy and
unemployed worker. There are broadly two approaches in the literature in modeling job search with
capital. Davidson et al (1988) uniﬁed vacancies and capital while Pissarides (2000, pp. 23) demonstrates
that vacancy and capital can be separated and the inclusion of capital will not altered the essential
feature of the unemployment model. We follow the latter to simplify the model. See the conclusion
section for more discussion.
4goods in sector i (i = T,N). The elasticity of substitution between the traded and non-
traded intermediate goods is 1/(1−ρ),a n dτ parameterizes the relative importance of
traded intermediate goods.
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived, risk-neutral and homogenous workers with
measure normalized to 1, who provide labor services for producing intermediate goods
as a worker. We further assume that the proportion of workers in the traded sector is
µ ∈ (0,1), and that in the non-traded sector is then (1 − µ).
Workers’ preferences are assumed to be deﬁned over the ﬁnal consumption good
alone. Following Pissarides (2000, p. 77), it is also assumed that consumption is
undertaken based on a household with Z members (which is large enough) so that each
worker can smooth his risk with other family members. This assumption ensures the
homogeneous preference of individuals. Time is continuous and the discount factor is
r ∈ (0,1).
Workers in either the traded or non-traded sector may be in one of two states:
employed or unemployed. If workers are employed, they will earn a wage, which is
equal to their marginal product value (pix), where pi is the relative price of intermediate
goods in sector i in terms of ﬁnal consumption good whose price is normalized to 1,
and x ∈ (0,x) is a worker’s productivity (or unit output per employed worker).2 A
worker’s productivity is assumed to be a random variable, which may be interpreted
as follows: although workers are homogeneous, they can have diﬀerent productivity
when they are combined with diﬀerent job positions. The diﬀerence in productivity
m a yb ea s s o c i a t e dw i t had i ﬀerence in the technology of each job vacancy. Assume
2Since we assume that workers are both ﬁrms’ owners and employees, wage is equal to the value of
ﬁrms’ output. This can be seen as an extreme case of the Non-Cooperative Nash Bargaining solution
(Pissarides, 2000).
5that a worker’s productivity x comes from an exogenous distribution, characterized
by a cumulative density function F(X) deﬁned by prob{x ≤ X} = F(X),w h e r ex is
assumed to be non-negative F(0) = 0, non-decreasing, and continuous from the right
with F(∞)=1. It is further assumed that workers’ productivity is bounded (i.e.,
x ≺∞such that F(x)=1 ). The relative price of sectoral goods pi is assumed to
be determined by international market (small country assumption). If workers are
unemployed, they will receive unemployment subsidy b, which can be more generally
interpreted as also including the imputed return from any unpaid leisure activities, such
as home production or recreation.
Since workers’ expected income from employment is usually more than that from
unemployment, unemployed workers are always active in job searching. Given that
unemployed workers and job vacancy meet each other with the exogenous arrival rate
(ai), unemployed workers decide whether to accept job opportunities by using the
optimal ‘stopping’ strategy: there exists a reservation wage w = pixR
i ,w h e r exR
i is
deﬁned as a worker’s reservation productivity similar to Pissarides (2000, p.37), but
from the perspective of workers rather than ﬁrms, such that unemployed workers may
accept the ﬁrst job opportunity available with a value higher than reservation wage w
or with a productivity higher than his reservation productivity xR
i , given exogenous
sectoral price pi. Meanwhile, all jobs in sector are assumed to end at exogenous job
destruction rate λi.
We assume that newly unemployed workers can freely choose which sector to search
but once they make the decision to search in a particular sector, they will continue
searching in the sector so that the unemployed worker is counted towards the unem-
ployment in that sector. In other words, unemployed workers, job vacancies and job
6matching processes are assumed to be sector speciﬁc though the two sectors are con-
nected through mobility of unemployed workers (similar to the assumption of Hosios,
1990, p. 329).
We ﬁrst consider a representative unemployed worker, who is searching for a job in
sector i.L e tUi and Vi denote the present value of the expected income stream when
unemployed and employed, respectively. If it is assumed that the worker can meet a
job opportunity at a random future time s (s ∼ ε(t)), and determine whether to match





e−rtbdt + e−rsEi], ∀i = T,N (2)
where the probability of being employed has been included within the expectation
operator E[•].
Unemployed workers will maximize the present value of the expected income stream
with ‘optimal choice’. If it is assumed that the time span that the unemployed worker
spends in looking for job opportunities follows an exponential distribution exp[−
R s
0 ai(t)dt],
the unemployed worker’s ﬂow (per period) income can be derived as a Bellman equation:




[Ei(x) − Ui]dF(x), ∀i = T,N. (3)
We now turn to a representative employed worker whose decision making is also
based on maximizing the present value of his expected income stream. If it is assumed
that any existing job will end up with a probability λi at a future time s0 (s0 ∼ ε(t)),
the employed worker’s present value of his expected income stream can be written as:





Ui], ∀i = T,N. (4)
Given that an employed worker’s income is a function of productivity, Ei = Ei(x)
(since an employed worker’s wage is wi = pix), the worker’s ﬂow (per period) income
can be derived as a Bellman equation:
rEi(x)=pix + λ[Ui − Ei(x)], ∀i = T,N. (5)
Equations (3) and (5) are two fundamental equations in the theory of search. They
can be interpreted as the ‘asset value’ in a perfect capital market with risk-free interest
rate r, with the assets being the unemployed worker’s human capital in (3), and the
employed worker’s human capital in (5), respectively. Equations (3) and (5) show that
employed workers’ (or unemployed workers) present value of expected income is always
equal to their current income plus opportunity costs (revenue) from possibly being
unemployed (or employed) in the future.
Combining equations (3) and (5) and using the ‘individual rationality’ condition
(Ei(xR
i )=Ui), the relationship between a worker’s reservation productivity and the








[1 − F(x)]dx =
b
pi
, ∀i = T,N. (6)
Equation (6) is the key equation in our model. It characterizes the determination
of the reservation productivity xR
i given the sectoral relative price, and has the familiar
interpretation as an optimal problem of an unemployed worker making the decision as
to whether to accept an oﬀer or to wait for better oﬀe r s .T os e ei tm o r ec l e a r l y ,w ec a n






i [1−F(x)]dx. The left side, pixR
i −b,i st h ec o s t
8of searching one more time when an oﬀer with wage pixR
i is in hand. The right side is
the expected beneﬁt of searching one more time in terms of the expected present value
associated with drawing pixi Â pixR
i ,w i t he ﬀective discount rate being r + λi,w h i c h
takes into account the probability that the job is destroyed. Thus, the agent’s optimal
decision is to set reservation productivity xR
i so that the cost of searching one more
time equals the beneﬁt.
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Figure 1 plots two curves, an upward sloping linear curve representing the cost of
searching one more time (pix − b) with slope pi and intercept −b, and a convex curve





i [1−F(x)]dx. The intersection of the two curves determined uniquely a worker’s
reservation productivity in sector i, xR
i .
An increase in the relative sectoral prices pi w i l le x e r ta ni m p a c to nb o t ht h ec o s t
9and beneﬁt of searching one more time, which shifts the cost curve to the left and
the beneﬁt curve to the right. Whether the new reservation productivity x0R
i would
be lower or higher than the old xR
i depends on the degree of relative shifts of both
cost and beneﬁt curves after the price shocks. From (6), we know that xR
i Â ξi(x);
hence, an increase in pi will lead to an increase in the cost of searching one more time
by pix, and an increase in beneﬁtb y4piξi(x), if a worker’s reservation productivity
remains unchanged. Intuitively, at the initial reservation productivity xR
i the increase in
cost of searching one more time clearly outweighs the increase in beneﬁtf o rs e a r c h i n g
one more time after the price shock, which violates the worker’s optimization rule.
Consequently, the worker adjusts down his reservation productivity to x0R
i so that at
the new price p0
i the optimal stopping rule still applies. To put it another way, when
the price of sectoral goods (pi) increases, the expected present value of job oﬀers faced
by unemployed workers in the same sector (Ei(x)) increases. Thus, a job oﬀer which
generates lower productivity and will be rejected at initial price pi can now be accepted.
Therefore, we established that the employed worker’s reservation productivity in sector
(xR
i ) is a decreasing function of the relative price of sectoral goods (pi), dxR
i /dpi ≺ 0,
if F(x) is assumed to be non-degenerate. This is summarized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 An increase (decrease) in the relative price of sectoral goods pi reduces (in-
creases) workers’ reservation productivity in that sector.
In equilibrium, job creation should be equal to job destruction for each sector, with
search unemployment in sector being written as:
ui =
λi
λi + ai[1 − F(xR
i )]
, ∀i = T,N. (7)
Equation (7) shows that the search unemployment rate in sector i is increasing
10with respect to job destruction rate (λi) and employed worker’s reservation produc-
tivity (xR
i ), while decreasing with respect to the probability of an unemployed worker
encountering a job opportunity (ai). This is closely related to the well-known Bev-
eridge relation (Beveridge, 1944), which combined with (6), determines sectoral search
unemployment in both the traded and non-traded sectors.
As it is assumed that there is no cost for unemployed workers to move across sectors,
unemployed workers in both the traded and non-traded sectors expect the same reward
in equilibrium, i.e., rUT = rUN. This provides a crucial link between the equilibria of




Equation (8) suggests that in equilibrium unemployed workers are indiﬀerent to
choosing which sector to search from as they expect the same expected present value
from employment in any sector. However, since their sectoral wages can be diﬀerent
(due to diﬀerent price of sectoral intermediate goods and workers’ productivity), their
duration of unemployment (or the unemployment rates in diﬀerent sectors) can be
diﬀerent, a result which also arises in eﬃciency wage models (Shapiro and Stiglitz
1984). Thus, search unemployment in our two-sector model with non-traded goods can
be uniquely determined.
The balance of payments is made between the traded intermediate goods and the
ﬁnal consumption goods, pTMT = q−c,w h e r eq and c denote domestic production and
consumption of ﬁnal goods, respectively, and pT is exogenous due to the small country
assumption. If the economy exports (imports) traded intermediate goods, it will import
(export) ﬁnal consumption goods. Thus, pT can be regarded as the economy’s terms
11of trade, and the quantity of the ﬁnal consumption goods (q) can be normalized to 1.
Finally, the production functions for sectoral goods can be written as the product
of employed workers’ productivity and sectoral unemployment. The market clearing
condition holds for both traded and non-traded intermediate goods in equilibrium. For
traded intermediate goods, net import is equal to domestic demand minus domestic
supply, and for non-traded intermediate goods, domestic demand is equal to domes-
tic supply. Market clearing conditions for traded intermediate goods and non-traded





















where MT represents the net import of traded intermediate goods.
The equilibrium of the two-sector search model with non-traded goods depends on
three groups of conditions: sectoral search unemployment conditions ([6] and [7]); no-
arbitrage condition across sectors ([8]); and product market clearance conditions ([9]
and [10]). Although simultaneous equations (6)-(10) cannot be solved explicitly, one
can easily prove the existence and the uniqueness of equilibrium solution in the model.
For simplicity, assume a worker’s sectoral productivity xi is a uniform distribution with
support at the unit interval [0, 1] (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2005). Substituting (6) and































Since (6) deﬁnes the monotonic decreasing relationship between pT and xR
T (dxR
T/dpT ≺
0 ), and (11) deﬁnes the monotonic increasing relationship between pT and xR
T (dxR
T/dpT Â
0), when we control the relative scale of the traded sector µ,4 there exists a unique com-
bination of sectoral relative price (pT ) and employed workers’ reservation (xR
T )i nt h e
traded sector. By the same token, (6) and (12) uniquely determine the combination of
sectoral relative price and a worker’s reservation productivity in the non-traded sector.
Combining the two sectoral equilibria with the no-arbitrage condition for unemployed
workers across sectors ([8]), the relative scale of the traded sector can then be uniquely
determined. Thus, the general equilibrium solution for the two-sector search trade
model with non-traded intermediate goods exists and can be uniquely determined.5
III. Terms of Trade Shocks and Unemployment
The two-sector model with non-traded goods and endogenous search unemployment
that we outlined in the previous section sets up the link between terms of trade shocks,
worker’s reservation productivity and the determination of employment. This provides
a framework to analyze the impact of terms of trade shocks on search unemployment
in a frictional labor market.
Lemma 2 An improvement (deterioration) in the terms of trade will result in a larger
(smaller) labor force adhered to the traded sector .
4This condition ensures that MT and µ are not changing, so that the relationship between pT and
x
R
T in (11) could be speciﬁed clearly.
5This result can be easily extended to a general case where the cumulative distribution function of
workers’ productivity is assumed to take a non-degenerate form (See Appendix for discussion).














N)2],we have µ =1 −2(1−τ
pN )
1
1−ρ/Π.S i n c edΠ/dxR
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0,a n ddxR







T h er e s u l to fL e m m a2c o n ﬁrms that in our model the conventional channel whereby
trade impacts on employment by changing the reallocation of employment across sectors
is still operative.
Proposition 1 An improvement (deterioration) in the terms of trade reduces (in-
creases) search unemployment in the traded sector.
Proof. From (6), an improvement in the terms of trade (pT) will decrease workers’
reservation productivity in the traded sector (xR







r+λT (1 − xR
T)]
≺ 0. (13)
From (7), a decrease in workers’ reservation productivity in the traded sector will re-





[λT + aT(1 − xR
T)]2 Â 0. (14)
Combining (13) and (14) and using the ‘rule of chains’, the relationship between
sectoral search unemployment rate (uT) and terms of trade (pT) can be written as
duT/dpT ≺ 0. That is, an improvement (deterioration) in the terms of trade will
reduce (increase) equilibrium search unemployment.
14Although the implication from Proposition 1 seems to be the same as that from the
traditional trade theory, the logic behind them is quite diﬀerent. Speciﬁcally, in tradi-
tional trade models, terms of trade shocks aﬀect the determination of employment only
by reallocating labor across sectors. Since an increase in the relative price of traded
goods may lead to an expansion of the traded sector, the traded sector with a positive
price shock may post a gain and a negative one may lose employment. However, in
the two—sector search model, terms of trade shocks aﬀect sectoral search employment
not only by changing the relative scale of the traded sector, as conﬁrmed in Lemma 2,
but also by changing the willingness of workers to search for jobs. The intuition is as
follows: since there exists costs for a job search, an increase (or decrease) in the relative
price of traded intermediate goods may improve (or reduce) employed workers’ expected
income (See [6]). Thus, unemployed workers in the traded sector would be more likely
to accept job oﬀers even if they have lower productivities than their counterparts in
import sectors. Consequently, search employment tends to increase, and vice versa.
From this perspective, the relationship between changes in the relative price of traded
intermediate goods and the determination of employment, predicted by our two-sector
model with search unemployment, encompasses not only inter-sectoral employment re-
allocation eﬀects but also intra-sectoral employment creation (or destruction) eﬀects,
which is consistent with Davidson et al (1999). This establishes an important chan-
nel for exploring the trade-employment relationship from the perspective of workers’
rational responses to expected income.
Proposition 2 An improvement (deterioration) in the terms of trade reduces (in-
creases) search unemployment in the non- traded sector.
15Proof. Given the CES production function (1) for the ﬁnal consumption goods with
ﬁxed output, the relative price of non-traded intermediate goods is positively related to
that of traded intermediate goods. That is, dpN/dpT Â 0. The reason is that an increase
(or decrease) in the relative price of traded intermediate goods increases (or reduces)
demand for non-traded intermediate goods, which leads to higher relative prices of non-
traded intermediate goods, given the production function of ﬁnal consumption goods.
From (6), a worker’s reservation productivity is negatively related to the relative
price of sectoral goods in the non-traded sector. Substituting dpN/dpT Â 0 into this
condition leads to a worker’s reservation productivity being negatively related to the
relative price of traded intermediate goods (dxN/dpT ≺ 0). This, combined with
duN/dxR
N Â 0 (derived from ([7]), shows that the sectoral search unemployment rate in
the non-traded sector is negatively related to the relative price of traded intermediate
goods (i.e., duN/dpT ≺ 0). That is, changes in search employment in the non-traded
sector follow the same direction as that in the traded sector.
Proposition 2 establishes the relationship between terms of trade shocks to the
traded intermediate goods and the determination of employment in the non-traded
sector, and search employment in the non-traded sector tends to go in the same direc-
tion as that in the traded sector for given price shocks to traded intermediate goods.
The mechanism can be explained as follows: when the relative prices of non-traded
intermediate goods increases (reduces) following the increase (decrease) in the relative
prices of traded intermediate goods, the expected income of employed workers in the
non-traded sector will tend to increase (decrease). Consequently, unemployed workers
are more (or less) willing to search for jobs in the non-traded sector and search employ-
16ment in the non-traded sector may increase (or decrease). This can be regarded as the
‘spill-over’ eﬀect of terms of trade shocks on unemployment in the non-traded sector.
Figure 2. Changes in Terms of Trade and Search Unemployment
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We illustrate the impact of terms of trade shocks on sectoral search unemployment
in Figure 2. Let the horizontal axis denote total labor supply in the economy which
has been normalized to 1, with an initial relative scale of the traded and non-traded
sectors being µ (or OA/OL)a n d1 − µ (or AL/OL), respectively. The vertical axis
represents the expected value of unemployed workers. From (6), we have that worker’s
reservation wage pixR
i is decreasing with respect to xR
i , which together with (7), where
sectoral unemployment rate ui is decreasing with respect to xR
i , suggests that pixR
i is
an increasing function of sectoral search employment, 1−ui. Thus, we have ETET and
ENEN representing the relationship between pixR
i and 1 − ui in the traded and non-
traded sectors, respectively. Changes in the price of sectoral intermediate goods pi will
result in shifts of both curves, which lead to changes of sectoral search unemployment.
17Consider a positive terms of trade shock from pT to p0
T, where search employment in
the traded sector increases from ETET to E0
TE0
T, as workers’ reservation productivity
decreases from xR
T to x0R
T , with sectoral search unemployment falling from BA to B0A.
At the same time, an increase in employment in the traded sector will increase the
output of traded intermediate goods, and improve the relative price of non-traded
intermediate goods, as well as employed workers’ expected income in the non-traded
sector, both of which tend to reduce search unemployment in the non-traded sector
from AC to AC0,s h i f t i n gENEN to E0
NE0
N.
Moreover, given the assumption of free mobility of unemployed workers across sec-
tors, a reduction in search unemployment in the traded sector will increase employed
workers’ expected income in the traded sector, which tends to attract unemployed
workers from the non-traded sector ﬂowing into the traded sector. As the traded sector









N horizontally to the right. In equilibrium, the relative scale of the traded sector
increases, from µ (or OA/OL)t oµ0 (or OA0/OL), and search employments in both the
traded and non-traded sectors increase, respectively.
Although both Propositions 1 and 2 are proved to be under the assumption that
employed workers’ productivities follow a uniform distribution function, it is easy to
prove that their validity is independent of this assumption. As long as the distribution
of workers’ productivity is non-degenerate, most of the foregoing discussion will hold
(see Appendix).
18IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we developed a simple two-sector search model with non-traded goods
to explore the impact of changes in terms of trade on search unemployment, a ques-
tion that has been prominent in discussion among policy makers but has received
little attention among international trade theorists, with the exception of, for example,
Davidson et al (1988, 1999), among others. To keep the model analytically tractable
so that the mechanism through which terms of trade shocks aﬀect unemployment can
be crystallized, we have deliberately kept the part on job search theory to a minimal.
We extended the inter-temporal job search model of McCall (1970) to a setting of two
sectors with non-traded goods and endogenize job search by introducing a worker’s
reservation productivity, à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
The payoﬀ with such a simple model is powerful results with analytical tractability.
We show that changes in terms of trade will not only impact employment by changing
the employment reallocation across sectors as in traditional trade models but more im-
portantly, it will aﬀect sectoral search unemployment by changing the expected income
of employed workers through aﬀecting their reservation productivity in both the traded
and non-traded sectors. Speciﬁcally, we show that an improvement (deterioration) of
terms of trade reduces (increases) unemployment rates in both traded and non-traded
sectors.
Our model can be extended to a full-blown search model along the lines of Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides’ search and matching technology, with two factors, capital and
labor. But as with many other models, it comes at a cost. As the model grows
more sophisticated, it becomes more and more challenging to arrive at results that
19are analytically solvable. Consequently, one has to rely on simulations to discuss the
results.
Our model can also be extended along other dimensions. For example, it can be
easily extended to discuss the impact of tariﬀ on unemployment. In our model, an
increase of tariﬀ would deliver the same result as a negative shock to terms of trade,
and will therefore increase unemployment in both traded and non-traded sectors. The
eﬀects of unemployment insurance on unemployment can also be addressed in our
framework. Finally, we have only focused our analysis on the steady state in this
paper and an extension to dynamic adjustment for out-of-steady-state will provide an
interesting dimension to the discussion of terms of trade shocks on unemployment. We
will leave these for future research.
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22Appendix
Some hints for generalizing the assumption of uniform distribution
The existence of general equilibrium of our two-sector search model is independent of
the assumption of a worker’s productivity taking the form of uniform distribution. As
long as we assume that the cumulative distribution function of a worker’s productivity
is non-degenerative, we have d
R x
xR
i [1 − F(x)]dx/dxR
i ≺ 0 which leads to dxR
T/dpT ≺ 0.
Equation (6) and d
R x
xR
i [1 − F(x)]dx/dxR
i ≺ 0 ensure dxR
T/dpT Â 0 in (11). We refer
readers to a detailed proof in Shimmer (1996).
P r o o fo fe q u a t i o n( 1 3 ) :
Assume that workers’ sectoral productivity x follows a uniform distribution function
with support on the unit interval [0, 1] (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2005). Substituting




i )2 = 2b
pi.




i )2 − 2b






r+λT (1 − xR
T) and ∂G/∂pT =2 b/p2









b ≺ 0,w h e r exR
T ≺ 1. ¥
P r o o fo fe q u a t i o n( 1 4 ) :
As workers’ sectoral productivity follows a uniform distribution, equation (7) can be




Taking the ﬁrst derivative of ui with respect to xR





0, ∀i = T,N. ¥
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